Two senses for 'givenness of consciousness'

The notion of ‘givenness of consciousness’ needs further elucidation. On the one hand, I agree with Lyyra (this volume) that one sense for ‘givenness of consciousness’ is not enough to account for consciousness and self-consciousness. On the other hand, I will argue that Lyyra’s paper is problematic precisely because he fails to consider one basic sense for ‘givenness of consciousness’. Lyyra and I thus agree that there must be (at least) two senses for ‘givenness of consciousness’; we disagree, however about which modes of givenness are involved.
Keywords Pre-reflective self-conciousness
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DOI 10.1007/s11097-008-9116-0
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Pessi Lyyra (2009). Two Senses for 'Givenness of Consciousness'. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (1):67-87.

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