Alternative paradigmatic hypotheses cannot be fairly evaluated from within one's own paradigmatic assumptions
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (4):430-439 (2003)
To avoid endless and futile debate, critics of an alternative paradigmatic hypothesis cannot simply state their own paradigmatic assumptions as if they were plain fact while dismissing those of the opposition as self-evidently absurd, because it is exactly those initial assumptions that are brought into question by the paradigmatic proposal. Perceived incredibility is no valid ground for rejection of a paradigm whose alternatives are at least equally incredible, and arguably more so.
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