Graduate studies at Western
Journal of Symbolic Logic 66 (1):295-317 (2001)
|Abstract||A vast and interesting family of natural semantics for belief revision is defined. Suppose one is given a distance d between any two models. One may then define the revision of a theory K by a formula α as the theory defined by the set of all those models of α that are closest, by d, to the set of models of K. This family is characterized by a set of rationality postulates that extends the AGM postulates. The new postulates describe properties of iterated revisions|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Craig Boutilier (1996). Iterated Revision and Minimal Change of Conditional Beliefs. Journal of Philosophical Logic 25 (3):263 - 305.
Adnan Darwiche & Judea Pearl (1997). On the Logic of Iterated Belief Revision. Artificial Intelligence 89:1-29.
Laura Giordano, Valentina Gliozzi & Nicola Olivetti (2002). Iterated Belief Revision and Conditional Logic. Studia Logica 70 (1):23-47.
Brian Hill (2008). Towards a “Sophisticated” Model of Belief Dynamics. Part II: Belief Revision. Studia Logica 89 (3):291 - 323.
Edwin D. Mares (2002). A Paraconsistent Theory of Belief Revision. Erkenntnis 56 (2):229 - 246.
Giacomo Bonanno (2012). Belief Change in Branching Time: AGM-Consistency and Iterated Revision. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (1):201-236.
Giacomo Bonanno (2007). Axiomatic Characterization of the AGM Theory of Belief Revision in a Temporal Logic. Artificial Intelligence 171 (2-3):144-160.
Michael J. Shaffer (2002). Coherence, Justification, and the AGM Theory of Belief Revision. In Yves Bouchard (ed.), Perspectives on Coherentism. Editions du Scribe.
Oliver Schulte (1999). Minimal Belief Change and the Pareto Principle. Synthese 118 (3):329-361.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads3 ( #214,062 of 740,795 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #61,957 of 740,795 )
How can I increase my downloads?