Gestalt isomorphism and the primacy of the subjective perceptual experience

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (6):763-764 (1998)
Abstract The Gestalt principle of isomorphism reveals the primacy of subjective experience as a valid source of evidence for the information encoded neurophysiologically. This theory invalidates the abstractionist view that the neurophysiological representation can be of lower dimensionality than the percept to which it gives rise.
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