Self-Trust: A Study of Reason, Knowledge, and Autonomy

Oxford University Press (1997)
The eminent philosopher Keith Lehrer offers an original and distinctively personal view of central aspects of the human condition, such as reason, knowledge, wisdom, autonomy, love, consensus, and consciousness. He argues that what is uniquely human is our capacity for evaluating our own mental states (such as beliefs and desires), and suggests that we have a system for such evaluation which allows the resolution of personal and interpersonal conflict. The keystone in this system is self-trust, on which reason, knowledge, and wisdom are grounded.
Keywords Philosophy of mind  Human beings  Self (Philosophy
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Call number B945.L4453.S45 1997
ISBN(s) 0198236654   9780198236658  
DOI 10.2307/2653569
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Raimo Tuomela (2000). Belief Versus Acceptance. Philosophical Explorations 3 (2):122 – 137.
Matthias Steup (2004). Internalist Reliabilism. Philosophical Issues 14 (1):403–425.
John Turri (2015). Unreliable Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (3):529-545.

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