David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Acta Analytica 26 (1):3-14 (2011)
Intentionality is a mark of the mental, as Brentano (1874) noted. Any representation or conception of anything has the feature of intentionality, which informally put, is the feature of being about something that may or may not exist. Visual artworks are about something, whether something literal or abstract. The artwork is a mentalized physical object. Aesthetic experience of the artwork illustrates the nature of intentionality as we focus attention on the phenomenology of the sensory exemplar. This focus of attention on the exemplar in aesthetic experience simultaneously exhibits what the intentional object is like and what our conception of it is like. The exemplar is Janus-faced, looking in one direction outward toward the objects conceived and in the other direction inward toward our conceiving of them. It shows us what intentionality is like and how we know it
|Keywords||Intentionality Representation Exemplar Aesthetic Content Artworks|
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Citations of this work BETA
Jenann Ismael (2011). Reflexivity, Fixed Points, and Semantic Descent; How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Reflexivity. Acta Analytica 26 (4):295-310.
Martina Fürst (2011). What Mary's Aboutness Is About. Acta Analytica 26 (1):63-74.
Martina Fürst (2012). Exemplarization: A Solution to the Problem of Consciousness? Philosophical Studies 161 (1):141-151.
Joseph Thomas Tolliver (2012). Tales of the Ineffable: Crafting Concepts in Aesthetic Experience. Philosophical Studies 161 (1):153-162.
Leopold Stubenberg (2012). Lehrer on Consciousness. Philosophical Studies 161 (1):131-140.
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