A localist solution to the regress of epistemic justification

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (3):395 – 421 (2005)
Guided by an account of the norms governing justificatory conversations, I propose that person-level epistemic justification is a matter of possessing a certain ability: the ability to provide objectively good reasons for one's belief by drawing upon considerations which one responsibly and correctly takes there to be no reason to doubt. On this view, justification requires responsible belief and is also objectively truth-conducive. The foundationalist doctrine of immediately justified beliefs is rejected, but so too is the thought that coherence in one's total belief system is sufficient, or indeed necessary, for justification. The problem of the regress is solved by exploiting the 'localist' idea that in order to possess the ability to justify any given belief, one only needs to be in a position to draw upon appropriate justified background beliefs to provide good reasons for holding the belief; one needn't be able to defend the relevant background beliefs, and so on, all at one sitting.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 14,255
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
David B. Annis (1978). A Contextualist Theory of Epistemic Justification. American Philosophical Quarterly 15 (3):213 - 219.
Philip Kitcher (1992). The Naturalists Return. Philosophical Review 101 (1):53-114.
Adam Leite (2004). On Justifying and Being Justified. Philosophical Issues 14 (1):219–253.

View all 9 references

Citations of this work BETA
Ben Bronner (2013). Assertions Only? Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):44-52.
Michael Rescorla (2009). Assertion and its Constitutive Norms. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (1):98-130.
Michael Rescorla (2009). Shifting the Burden of Proof? Philosophical Quarterly 59 (234):86-109.
Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

20 ( #130,548 of 1,700,300 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

3 ( #206,271 of 1,700,300 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.