David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (3):395 – 421 (2005)
Guided by an account of the norms governing justificatory conversations, I propose that person-level epistemic justification is a matter of possessing a certain ability: the ability to provide objectively good reasons for one's belief by drawing upon considerations which one responsibly and correctly takes there to be no reason to doubt. On this view, justification requires responsible belief and is also objectively truth-conducive. The foundationalist doctrine of immediately justified beliefs is rejected, but so too is the thought that coherence in one's total belief system is sufficient, or indeed necessary, for justification. The problem of the regress is solved by exploiting the 'localist' idea that in order to possess the ability to justify any given belief, one only needs to be in a position to draw upon appropriate justified background beliefs to provide good reasons for holding the belief; one needn't be able to defend the relevant background beliefs, and so on, all at one sitting.
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References found in this work BETA
James Pryor (2000). The Skeptic and the Dogmatist. Noûs 34 (4):517–549.
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Citations of this work BETA
Mikkel Gerken (2012). Discursive Justification and Skepticism. Synthese 189 (2):373-394.
Michael Rescorla (2009). Assertion and its Constitutive Norms. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (1):98-130.
Coos Engelsma (2015). Arbitrary Foundations? On Klein’s Objection to Foundationalism. Acta Analytica 30 (4):389-408.
Ben Bronner (2013). Assertions Only? Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):44-52.
Michael Rescorla (2009). Shifting the Burden of Proof? Philosophical Quarterly 59 (234):86-109.
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