David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Topoi 26 (1):115-132 (2007)
On the basis of impossibility results on probability, belief revision, and conditionals, it is argued that conditional beliefs differ from beliefs in conditionals qua mental states. Once this is established, it will be pointed out in what sense conditional beliefs are still conditional, even though they may lack conditional contents, and why it is permissible to still regard them as beliefs, although they are not beliefs in conditionals. Along the way, the main logical, dispositional, representational, and normative properties of conditional beliefs are studied, and it is explained how the failure of not distinguishing conditional beliefs from beliefs in conditionals can lead philosophical and empirical theories astray.
|Keywords||Belief Conditional Belief revision Conditionalization Ramsey|
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Citations of this work BETA
Paul Égré & Mikaël Cozic (2011). If-Clauses and Probability Operators. Topoi 30 (1):17-29.
Niels Skovgaard‐Olsen (2016). Ranking Theory and Conditional Reasoning. Cognitive Science 40 (4):848-880.
Eric Pacuit (2013). Dynamic Epistemic Logic I: Modeling Knowledge and Belief. Philosophy Compass 8 (9):798-814.
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