Believing one's reasons are good

Synthese 161 (3):419 - 441 (2008)
Abstract
Is it coherent to suppose that in order to hold a belief responsibly, one must recognize something else as a reason for it? This paper addresses this question by focusing on so-called “Inferential Internalist” principles, that is principles of the following form: in order for one to have positive epistemic status Ø in virtue of believing P on the basis of R, one must believe that R evidentially supports P, and one must have positive epistemic status Ø in relation to that latter belief as well. While such principles and their close relatives figure centrally in a wide variety of recent epistemological discussions, there is confusion in the literature about what, precisely, Inferential Internalism commits one to and whether it is so much as coherent. This paper (1) articulates a broader framework for understanding the notion of epistemic responsibility, (2) motivates Inferential Internalism on the basis of considerations about the basing relation, epistemic responsibility, and parallels with practical deliberation, (3) defends Inferential Internalism against charges of incoherence leveled by James Van Cleve and Paul Boghossian, and (4) shows that contrary to a currently widespread view, Inferential Internalism is coherent even if foundationalism and the a priori are rejected. The paper closes with a preliminary argument for an affirmative answer to the initiating question about the requirements of epistemic responsibility.
Keywords Epistemic responsibility  Inferential Internalism  Foundationalism  Regress  Deliberation  Basing relation  Epistemic reasons  A priori  Paul Boghossian  James Van Cleve  Fichard Fumerton
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References found in this work BETA
Paul Boghossian (2003). Blind Reasoning. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 77 (1):225–248.

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Citations of this work BETA
B. J. C. Madison (2010). Epistemic Internalism. Philosophy Compass 5 (10):840-853.
Adam Leite (2010). How to Take Skepticism Seriously. Philosophical Studies 148 (1):39 - 60.
Don Fallis (2013). Davidson Was Almost Right About Lying. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (2):337-353.
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