Epistemic instrumentalism and reasons for belief: A reply to Tom Kelly's "epistemic rationality as instrumental rationality: A critique"
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2):456–464 (2007)
Tom Kelly argues that instrumentalist aeeounts of epistemie rationality fail beeause what a person has reason to believe does not depend upon the eontent of his or her goals. However, his argument fails to distinguish questions about what the evidence supports from questions about what a person ought to believe. Once these are distinguished, the instrumentalist ean avoid Kelly’s objeetions. The paperconcludes by sketehing what I take to be the most defensible version of the instrumentalist view.
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Samuel Schindler (2013). The Kuhnian Mode of HPS. Synthese 190 (18):4137-4154.
Christopher Cowie (2014). Epistemic Disagreement and Practical Disagreement. Erkenntnis 79 (1):191-209.
Matthew Lockard (2013). Epistemic Instrumentalism. Synthese 190 (9):1701-1718.
Daniel Laurier (2013). Les Raisons Épistémiques Sont-Elles Instrumentales? Dialogue 52 (2):211-231.
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