Hodges' theorem does not account for determinacy of translation. A reply to Werning

Erkenntnis 62 (3):411 - 425 (2005)
Abstract
Werning applies a theorem by Hodges in order to put forward an argument against Quine’s thesis of the indeterminacy of translation (understood as a thesis on meaning, not on reference) and in favour of what Werning calls ‘semantic realism’. We show that the argument rests on two critical premises both of which are false. The reasons for these failures are explained and the actual place of this application of Hodges’ theorem within Quine’s philosophy of language is outlined.
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy   Epistemology   Ethics   Logic   Ontology
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References found in this work BETA
W. V. Quine (1992). Pursuit of Truth. Harvard University Press.
W. V. Quine (1996). Progress on Two Fronts. Journal of Philosophy 93 (4):159-163.

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