How to link assertion and knowledge without going contextualist: A reply to DeRose's "assertion, knowledge, and context"

Philosophical Studies 134 (2):111 - 129 (2007)
Keith DeRose has recently argued that the contextual variability of appropriate assertion, together with the knowledge account of assertion, yields a direct argument that ’knows’ is semantically contextsensitive. The argument fails because of an equivocation on the notion of warranted assertability. Once the equivocation is removed, it can be seen that the invariantist can retain the knowledge account of assertion and explain the contextual variability of appropriate assertion by appealing to Williamson’s suggestion that practical and conversational considerations can influence the extent to which adherence to the constitutive norm of assertion matters.
Keywords assertion  contextualism  DeRose  epistemology  Williamsonm
Categories (categorize this paper)
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 9,360
External links
  • Through your library Configure
    References found in this work BETA
    Thomas A. Blackson (2004). An Invalid Argument for Contextualism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (2):344–345.
    Citations of this work BETA
    Matthew McGrath (2010). Contextualism and Intellectualism. Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):383-405.
    Similar books and articles

    Monthly downloads

    Added to index


    Total downloads

    52 ( #25,829 of 1,088,831 )

    Recent downloads (6 months)

    1 ( #69,666 of 1,088,831 )

    How can I increase my downloads?

    My notes
    Sign in to use this feature

    Start a new thread
    There  are no threads in this forum
    Nothing in this forum yet.