David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Social Philosophy and Policy 18 (02):79- (2001)
Do moral properties figure in the best explanatory account of the world? According to a popular realist argument, if they do, then they earn their ontological rights, for only properties that figure in the best explanation of experience are real properties. Although this realist strategy has been widely influential—not just in metaethics, but also in philosophy of mind and philosophy of science—no one has actually made the case that moral realism requires: namely, that moral facts really will figure in the best explanatory picture of the world. This issue may have been neglected in part because the influential dialectic on moral explanations between philosophers Gilbert Harman and Nicholas Sturgeon has focused debate on whether moral facts figure in relevant explanations. Yet as others have noted, explanatory relevance is irrelevant when it comes to realism: after all, according to the popular realist argument, it is inference to the best explanation of experience that is supposed to confer ontological rights. I propose to ask, then, the relevant question about moral explanations: should we think that moral properties will figure in the best explanatory account of the world?
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Citations of this work BETA
Ralph Wedgwood (2006). The Normative Force of Reasoning. Noûs 40 (4):660–686.
Brad Majors (2007). Moral Explanation. Philosophy Compass 2 (1):1–15.
Antti Kauppinen (2002). Reason, Recognition, and Internal Critique. Inquiry 45 (4):479 – 498.
Abraham Graber (2012). Medusa's Gaze Reflected: A Darwinian Dilemma for Anti-Realist Theories of Value. [REVIEW] Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (5):589-601.
Lei Zhong (2012). An Explanatory Challenge to Moral Reductionism. Theoria 78 (4):309-325.
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