On Williamson's arguments that knowledge is a mental state

Ratio 18 (2):165–175 (2005)
Is knowledge a mental state? For philosophers working within the idealistic tradition, the answer is trivial: there is nothing else for knowledge to be. For most others, however, the claim has seemed prima facie implausible. Knowing that p requires or involves the fact that p, or p’s truth, and that – with certain specifiable exceptions – is quite independent of my (or anyone’s) mind; so while knowledge may require or involve certain mental states, it itself is not a state of mind.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9329.2005.00281.x
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