On Williamson's arguments that knowledge is a mental state
Ratio 18 (2):165–175 (2005)
| Abstract | Is knowledge a mental state? For philosophers working within the idealistic tradition, the answer is trivial: there is nothing else for knowledge to be. For most others, however, the claim has seemed prima facie implausible. Knowing that p requires or involves the fact that p, or p’s truth, and that – with certain specifiable exceptions – is quite independent of my (or anyone’s) mind; so while knowledge may require or involve certain mental states, it itself is not a state of mind. | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,859 |
| External links |
 |
| Through your library | Configure |
Similar books and articlesBerit Brogaard (forthcoming). Knowledge-How: A Unified Account. In J. Bengson & M. Moffett (eds.), Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action. Oxford University Press.
Albert Newen & Gottfried Vosgerau (2007). A Representational Account of Self-Knowledge. Erkenntnis 67 (2):337 - 353.
Ram Neta & Guy Rohrbaugh (2004). Luminosity and the Safety of Knowledge. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 85 (4):396–406.
Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (2005). Williamson on Knowledge, Action, and Causation. Sats - Nordic Journal of Philosophy 6:15-28.
Baron Reed (2005). Accidentally Factive Mental States. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1):134 - 142.
Baron Reed (2005). Accidentally Factive Mental States. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1):134–142.
Jennifer Nagel (forthcoming). Knowledge as a Mental State. Oxford Studies in Epistemology.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2009-01-28Total downloads32 ( #38,606 of 556,747 )Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #27,178 of 556,747 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
