David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Journal of Philosophical Logic 34 (2):155-192 (2005)
What kinds of sentences with truth predicate may be inserted plausibly and consistently into the T-scheme? We state an answer in terms of dependence: those sentences which depend directly or indirectly on non-semantic states of affairs (only). In order to make this precise we introduce a theory of dependence according to which a sentence φ is said to depend on a set Φ of sentences iff the truth value of φ supervenes on the presence or absence of the sentences of Φ in/from the extension of the truth predicate. Both φ and the members of Φ are allowed to contain the truth predicate. On that basis we are able define notions such as ungroundedness or self-referentiality within a classical semantics, and we can show that there is an adequate definition of truth for the class of sentences which depend on non-semantic states of affairs
|Keywords||dependence self-referentiality supervenience truth ungroundedness|
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Øystein Linnebo (2009). Bad Company Tamed. Synthese 170 (3):371 - 391.
Andrew Thomas (2011). Deflationism and the Dependence of Truth on Reality. Erkenntnis 75 (1):113-122.
Leon Horsten (2010). Impredicative Identity Criteria. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (2):411-439.
Toby Meadows (2013). Truth, Dependence and Supervaluation: Living with the Ghost. Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (2):221-240.
Volker Halbach (2006). How Not to State T-Sentences. Analysis 66 (4):276–280.
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