Arguments against direct realism and how to counter them

American Philosophical Quarterly 41 (3):221-234 (2004)
Since the demise of the Sense-Datum independent objects or events to be objects Theory and Phenomenalism in the last cenof perception; however, unlike Direct Retury, Direct Realism in the philosophy of alists, Indirect Realists take this percepperception has enjoyed a resurgence of tion to be indirect by involving a prior popularity.1 Curiously, however, although awareness of some tertium quid between there have been attempts in the literature the mind and external objects or events.3 to refute some of the arguments against Idealists and Phenomenalists agree with Direct Realism, there has been, as of yet, the Indirect Realists.
Keywords Argument  Direct Realism  Epistemology  Perception  Phenomenalism
Categories (categorize this paper)
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 15,974
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Jeffrey Dunn (2008). The Obscure Act of Perception. Philosophical Studies 139 (3):367-393.
Walter Horn (2010). Reid and Hall on Perceptual Relativity and Error. Journal of Scottish Philosophy 8 (2):115-145.

View all 9 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

280 ( #3,117 of 1,725,822 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

32 ( #33,133 of 1,725,822 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.