David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Erkenntnis 62 (2):145-155 (2005)
Alvin Goldman contends that, in addition to the familiar sense or use of the term “knowledge” according to which knowledge is at least true justified belief, there is a weaker yet strict sense or use of the term “knowledge” according to which knowledge amounts to nothing more than information-possession or mere true belief. In this paper, I argue that Goldman has failed to show that there is such a weaker sense, and that, even if he had shown this, he has not shown that this putative weaker sense is a strict one by his own criterion for strictness.
|Keywords||Philosophy Philosophy Epistemology Ethics Logic Ontology|
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References found in this work BETA
Alvin Plantinga (1993). Warrant and Proper Function. Oxford University Press.
John Hawthorne (2002). Deeply Contingent a Priori Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2):247-269.
Crispin Sartwell (1992). Why Knowledge is Merely True Belief. Journal of Philosophy 89 (4):167-180.
Crispin Sartwell (1991). Knowledge is Merely True Belief. American Philosophical Quarterly 28 (2):157-165.
Citations of this work BETA
Pierre Le Morvan (2008). Epistemic Means and Ends: A Reply to Hofmann. Synthese 162 (2):251-264.
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