David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Journal of Philosophical Research 30:283-302 (2005)
Exploring intentionality from an externalist perspective, I distinguish three kinds of intentionality in the case of seeing, which I call transparent, translucent, and opaque respectively. I then extend the distinction from seeing to knowing, and then to believing. Having explicated the three-fold distinction, I then critically explore some important consequences that follow from granting that there are transparent and translucent intentional states and these intentional states are mental states. These consequences include: first, that existential opacity is neither the mark of intentionality nor of the mental; second, that Sellars has not shown that all intentionality is non-relational; third, that a key Quinean argument for semantic indeterminacy rests on a false premise; fourth, that perceptual experience is intentional on Alston’s Theory of Appearing; fifth, that either some mental causation is more than internal physiological causation or some mental states are epiphenomenal
|Keywords||Externalism Intentionality Mental States Metaphysics Mind Sellars, Wilfrid|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Pierre Le Morvan (2008). Sensory Experience and Intentionalism. Philosophy Compass 3 (4):685-702.
Similar books and articles
Peter King (2010). Mediaeval Intentionality and Pseudo-Intentionality. Quaestio 10 (1):25-44.
Wilfrid S. Sellars (1953). A Semantical Solution of the Mind-Body Problem. Methodos 5 (September):45-84.
Nicholas S. Thompson & Patrick G. Derr (1993). The Intentionality of Some Ethological Terms. Behavior and Philosophy 2 (21):15-24.
David J. Chalmers (2004). The Representational Character of Experience. In Brian Leiter (ed.), The Future for Philosophy. Oxford University Press 153--181.
William P. Bechtel (1993). Decomposing Intentionality: Perspectives on Intentionality Drawn From Language Research with Two Species of Chimpanzees. [REVIEW] Biology and Philosophy 8 (1):1-32.
John R. Searle (1984). Intentionality and its Place in Nature. Synthese 38 (October):87-100.
Ansgar Beckermann (1996). Is There a Problem About Intentionality? Erkenntnis 45 (1):1-24.
Terence Horgan & John Tienson (2002). The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality. In David J. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. OUP Usa 520--533.
Anders Nes (2008). Are Only Mental Phenomena Intentional? Analysis 68 (299):205–215.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads97 ( #44,597 of 1,934,854 )
Recent downloads (6 months)6 ( #92,052 of 1,934,854 )
How can I increase my downloads?