Morality, self-interest, and two kinds of prudential practical rationality

Philosophia 34 (1):85-93 (2006)
:  In this article it is assumed that human goodness is to be judged with respect to how well one does at practical reasoning. It is acknowledged that (1) there is a difference between moral practical reasoning (MPR) and prudential practical reasoning (PPR) and (2) what these would recommend sometimes conflict. A distinction is then made between absolute PPR and relative PPR and it is argued that doing well at absolute PPR is always consistent with MPR. It is also argued that since it is more reasonable to assess prudential practical rationality in terms of the absolute standard than the relative standard, there is no conflict between the demands of MPR (<span class='Hi'>morality</span>) and PPR (<span class='Hi'>self</span>-interest).
Keywords morality  self-interest  practical reason  Aristotle  virtue ethics
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DOI 10.1007/s11406-006-9002-3
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References found in this work BETA
Peter Singer (1993). Practical Ethics. Cambridge University Press.
Thomas Hurka (1993). Perfectionism. Oxford University Press.
David P. Gauthier (1967). Morality and Advantage. Philosophical Review 76 (4):460-475.
Stephen Clark & R. Kraut (1993). Aristotle on the Human Good. Journal of Hellenic Studies 113 (3):193.

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