Journal of Ethics 2 (4):321-337 (1998)
|Abstract||I defend the view that there are organic unities mainly by presenting examples of organic unities. I also defend the view against two objections. The first objection appeals to the notion of an evaluatively incomplete state of affairs. The second objection holds that the intrinsic value of a state of affairs can be different in different contexts. I argue that neither objection provides a compelling reason for rejecting these examples.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Noah Marcelino Lemos (1994). Intrinsic Value: Concept and Warrant. Cambridge University Press.
Thomas Hurka (1998). Two Kinds of Organic Unity. Journal of Ethics 2 (4):299-320.
Erik Carlson (1997). A Note on Moore's Organic Unities. Journal of Value Inquiry 31 (1):55-59.
Ernest Nagel (1952). Wholes, Sums, and Organic Unities. Philosophical Studies 3 (2):17 - 32.
Jonathan Dancy (2003). Are There Organic Unities? Ethics 113 (3):629-650.
Michael Clark (2006). Retribution and Organic Unities. Journal of Moral Philosophy 3 (3):351-358.
Michael J. Zimmerman (1999). Virtual Intrinsic Value and the Principle of Organic Unities. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (3):653 - 666.
Michael J. Zimmerman (1999). Virtual Intrinsic Value and the Principle of Organic Unities. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (3):653-666.
Erik Carlson (2001). Organic Unities, Non-Trade-Off, and the Additivity of Intrinsic Value. Journal of Ethics 5 (4):335-360.
Stuart Rachels (2004). Six Theses About Pleasure. Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):247-267.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads25 ( #49,684 of 549,683 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,425 of 549,683 )
How can I increase my downloads?