Sensory experience and intentionalism

Philosophy Compass 3 (4):685-702 (2008)
Increasingly prominent in the recent literature on the philosophy of perception, Intentionalism holds that sensory experience is inherently intentional, where to be intentional is to be about, or directed on, something. This article explores Intentionalism's prospects as a viable ontological and epistemological alternative to the traditional trinity of theories of sensory experience: the Sense-Datum Theory, the Adverbial Theory, and the Theory of Appearing.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2008.00148.x
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References found in this work BETA
John McDowell (1994). Mind and World. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
John Searle (1983). Intentionality. Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
Greg Janzen (2013). An Adverbialist–Objectualist Account of Pain. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (4):859-876.

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