Summation, variety, and indeterminate value

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13 (1):33 - 44 (2010)
Abstract
In this paper, I consider two sorts of objections to summative theories of value. The first objection concerns “indeterminate” value. The second concerns the importance of variety. I argue that both objections pose serious problems for the summative approach. I also argue that if we accept certain plausible views about the value of variety, we should reject certain forms of argument concerning what sorts of states have intrinsic value.
Keywords Value  Intrinsic value  Summation  Organic unities  Fred Feldman
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Fred Feldman (2000). Basic Intrinsic Value. Philosophical Studies 99 (3):319-346.

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