The FA Analysis of Emotional Values and Practical Reasons

Dialogue 51 (1):31-53 (2012)
ABSTRACT: Confronted with the, several proponents of the fitting attitude analysis of emotional values have argued in favor of an epistemic approach. In such a view, an emotion fits its object because the emotion is correct. However, I argue that we should reorient our search towards a practical approach because only practical considerations can provide a satisfying explanation of the fittingness of emotional responses. This practical approach is partially revisionist, particularly because it is no longer an analysis of final value and because it is relativistic
Keywords value theory  Fitting attitude analysis
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1017/S0012217312000224
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 15,914
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Jonas Olson (2004). Buck-Passing and the Wrong Kind of Reasons. Philosophical Quarterly 54 (215):295–300.

View all 6 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Chris Heathwood (2008). Fitting Attitudes and Welfare. Oxford Studies in Metaethics 3:47-73.
Johan Brännmark (2009). Goodness, Values, Reasons. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (4):329 - 343.
Joshua Gert (2005). A Functional Role Analysis of Reasons. Philosophical Studies 124 (3):353 - 378.
Ishtiyaque Haji (2009). Freedom and Practical Reason. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (2):169 - 179.

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

9 ( #246,261 of 1,725,584 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

1 ( #349,436 of 1,725,584 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.