The precautionary principle: Scientific uncertainty and type I and type II errors [Book Review]

Foundations of Science 2 (2):207-236 (1997)
Abstract
We provide examples of the extent and nature of environmental and human health problems and show why in the United States prevailing scientific and legal burden of proof requirements usually cannot be met because of the pervasiveness of scientific uncertainty. We also provide examples of how may assumptions, judgments, evaluations, and inferences in scientific methods are value-laden and that when this is not recognized results of studies will appear to be more factual and value-neutral than warranted. Further, we show that there is a "tension" between the use of the 95 percent confidence rule as a normative basis to reduce speculation in scientific knowledge and other public policy and moral concerns embodied by the adoption of a precautionary principle. Finally, although there is no precise agreement regarding what a precautionary principle might entail, we make several recommendations regarding the placement of the burden of proof and the standard of proof that ought to be required in environmental and human health matters.
Keywords Precautionary principle  Sustainable development  Scientific uncertainty
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 11,826
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Citations of this work BETA
Similar books and articles
B. D. (2003). Is the Precautionary Principle Unscientific? Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 34 (2):329-344.
Jonathan Hughes (2006). How Not to Criticize the Precautionary Principle. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 31 (5):447 – 464.
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

42 ( #42,902 of 1,100,127 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

9 ( #27,984 of 1,100,127 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.