David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Journal of Philosophical Research 25:285-309 (2000)
This article provides a defense of a variety of MacIntyrean arguments against emotivism. In After Virtue MacIntyre explains that emotivism might be understood either as a theory about the meaning or about the function of moral language. He also argues that emotivism is false either way. I argue that MacIntyre is right about this by explaining and then answering the recent defenses of emotivism that have appeared in the literature. I conclude by reminding the reader that according to MacIntyre his attacks on emotivism also serve as attacks on other subjectivist ethical theories, such as prescriptivism and existentialism. Thus, if he is right about this, then his critique of emotivism has more far ranging implications than one might initially suppose
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Stephen Satris (1987). Ethical Emotivism. Distributors for the U.S. And Canada, Kluwer Academic Publishers.
James Edwin Mahon (2013). MacIntyre and the Emotivists. In Fran O'Rourke (ed.), What Happened in and to Moral Philosophy in the Twentieth Century. University of Notre Dame Press
Gunnar Björnsson (2002). How Emotivism Survives Immoralists, Irrationality, and Depression. Southern Journal of Philosophy 40 (3):327-344.
Kyle Swan (2002). Emotivism and Deflationary Truth. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 83 (3):270–281.
Nathan Nobis (2004). Ayer and Stevenson's Epistemological Emotivisms. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 4 (1):59-79.
Charles R. Pigden (1996). Bertrand Russell: Meta-Ethical Pioneer. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 26 (2):181-204.
Gunnar Björnsson (2001). Why Emotivists Love Inconsistency. Philosophical Studies 104 (1):81 - 108.
Charles Pigden, Russell's Moral Philosophy. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
B. Korkut (2012). MacIntyre's Nietzsche or Nietzschean MacIntyre? Philosophy and Social Criticism 38 (2):199-214.
John L. Barger (1980). The Meaningful Character of Value-Language: A Critique of the Linguistic Foundations of Emotivism. [REVIEW] Journal of Value Inquiry 14 (2):77-91.
Brian K. Steverson (2008). Biogeography and Evolutionary Emotivism. Ethics, Place and Environment 11 (1):33 – 48.
Lucius Garvin (1958). Emotivism, Expression, and Symbolic Meaning. Journal of Philosophy 55 (3):111-118.
Robert G. Olson (1959). Emotivism and Moral Skepticism. Journal of Philosophy 56 (18):722-730.
John Sweigart (1964). The Distance Between Hume and Emotivism. Philosophical Quarterly 14 (56):229-236.
Added to index2011-12-02
Total downloads40 ( #83,639 of 1,726,249 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #183,615 of 1,726,249 )
How can I increase my downloads?