David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Inquiry 27 (December):363-380 (1984)
This paper characterizes a form of materialism which is strongly anti?reductionist with regard to mental predicates. It argues against the functionalist views of writers such as Brian Loar on the basis that the counterfactual interdependencies of intentional states are governed by constraints of rationality embodied in semantic links which cannot be captured in non?intentional, functionalist terms. However, contrary to what is commonly supposed, such anti?reductionism requires neither instrumentalism about the mental nor opposition to a causal explanatory view of intentional explanation. The paper therefore aims to show that a realist causal explanatory view of psychological states is compatible with a non?reductive materialism (a position excluded by Brian Loar in his recent book Mind and Meaning)
|Keywords||Epistemology Materialism Reductionism Loar, B|
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References found in this work BETA
Hartry Field (1975). Conventionalism and Instrumentalism in Semantics. Noûs 9 (4):375-405.
Jerry A. Fodor (1975). The Language of Thought. Harvard University Press.
Brian Loar (1981). Mind and Meaning. Cambridge University Press.
John McDowell (1978). Physicalism and Primitive Denotation: Field on Tarski. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 13 (1):131 - 152.
Colin McGinn (1980). Philosophical Materialism. Synthese 44 (June):173-206.
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