Disciplined syntacticism and moral expressivism

Abstract
Moral Expressivists typically concede that, in some minimal sense, moral sentences are truth-apt but claim that in some more robust sense they are not. The Immodest Disciplined Syntacticist, a species of minimalist about truth, raises a doubt as to whether this contrast can be made out. I here address this challenge by motivating and describing a distinction between reducibly and irreducibly truth-apt sentences. In the light of this distinction the Disciplined Syntacticist must either adopt a more modest version of his theory, friendlier to Expressivism, or substantially modify it, abandoning one of its central conditions on truth-aptness. One natural and promising such modification, the Pure Discipline View, is described and its implications for an understanding of Expressivism briefly discussed
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References found in this work BETA
Review author[S.]: Simon Blackburn (1992). Gibbard on Normative Logic. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (4):947-952.
Paul A. Boghossian (1990). The Status of Content. Philosophical Review 99 (2):157-84.

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Nate Charlow (2014). Logic and Semantics for Imperatives. Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (4):617-664.

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