Philosophia Mathematica 13 (3):277-293 (2005)
|Abstract||This paper responds to John Burgess's ‘Mathematics and Bleak House’. While Burgess's rejection of hermeneutic fictionalism is accepted, it is argued that his two main attacks on revolutionary fictionalism fail to meet their target. Firstly, ‘philosophical modesty’ should not prevent philosophers from questioning the truth of claims made within successful practices, provided that the utility of those practices as they stand can be explained. Secondly, Carnapian scepticism concerning the meaningfulness of metaphysical existence claims has no force against a naturalized version of fictionalism, according to which our ordinary standards of scientific evidence may show that we have no reason to believe the mathematical existence claims made within the context of our mathematical and scientific theories.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Daniel Nolan, Modal Fictionalism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Matti Eklund (2005). Fiction, Indifference, and Ontology. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (3):557–579.
Matti Eklund (2005). Fiction, Indifference, and Ontology. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (3):557-579.
B. Armour-Garb (2011). Understanding and Mathematical Fictionalism. Philosophia Mathematica 19 (3):335-344.
Jason Stanley (2001). Hermeneutic Fictionalism. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 25 (1):36–71.
Chris John Daly (2008). Fictionalism and the Attitudes. Philosophical Studies 139 (3):423 - 440.
Gábor Forrai (2010). What Mathematicians' Claims Mean : In Defense of Hermeneutic Fictionalism. Hungarian Philosophical Review 54 (4):191-203.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads33 ( #36,649 of 551,105 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #37,370 of 551,105 )
How can I increase my downloads?