Burge's Contextual Theory of Truth and the Super-Liar Paradox

In Michal Pelis Vit Puncochar (ed.), The Logica Yearbook 2011. College Publications (2012)
Abstract
One recently proposed solution to the Liar paradox is the contextual theory of truth. Tyler Burge (1979) argues that truth is an indexical notion and that the extension of the truth predicate shifts during Liar reasoning. A Liar sentence might be true in one context and false in another. To many, contextualism seems to capture our pre-theoretic intuitions about the semantic paradoxes; this is especially due to its reliance on the so-called Revenge phenomenon. I, however, show that Super-Liar sentences (where a Super-Liar sentence is a sentence which says of itself that it is not true in any context) generate a significant problem for Burge’s contextual theory of truth.
Keywords Liar paradox  Super-Liar paradox  Contextualism  Tyler Burge
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