Philosophical Studies 129 (2):377 - 391 (2006)
|Abstract||Ernest Sosa’s virtue perspectivism goes beyond standard reliabilism by requiring that agents with justified beliefs not only derive their beliefs from virtuous cognitive faculties but have an epistemic perspective that explains the origin of the beliefs and makes their belief-set coherent. I argue that Sosa’s account of the epistemic perspective does not ensure that the perspective will confer justification. An adequate epistemic perspective must establish a non-accidental connection between an agent’s use of a faculty in certain circumstances and its reliability in those circumstances. An agent who is capable of judging the reliability of her faculties in different situations will have a perspective that meets this requirement. Revising virtue perspectivism in this way also permits a stronger response to doxastic ascent arguments against the theory.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Nancy Daukas (2006). Epistemic Trust and Social Location. Episteme 3 (1-2):109-124.
Benjamin Kiesewetter (2011). 'Ought' and the Perspective of the Agent. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 5 (3):1-24.
John Greco (2003). Virtue and Luck, Epistemic and Otherwise. Metaphilosophy 34 (3):353-366.
Lawrence M. Hinman, Alcalá Park & San Diego, Virtue Ethics From a Global Perspective: A Pluralistic Framework for Understanding Moral Virtues.
Michael Pauen (2012). The Second-Person Perspective. Inquiry 55 (1):33 - 49.
Dan D. Crawford (1991). On Having Reasons for Perceptual Beliefs: A Sellarsian Perspective. Journal of Philosophical Research 16:107-123.
Colin Cheyne (2009). A Paradox of Justified Believing. Ratio 22 (3):278-290.
Klemens Kappel (2011). Is Epistemic Expressivism Dialectically Incoherent? Dialectica 65 (1):49-69.
Michael DePaul (2011). Sosa, Certainty and the Problem of the Criterion. Philosophical Papers 40 (3):287-304.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads9 ( #122,367 of 722,827 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #60,541 of 722,827 )
How can I increase my downloads?