Against Metaphorical Meaning

Topoi 29 (2):165-180 (2010)
The commonplace view about metaphorical interpretation is that it can be characterized in traditional semantic and pragmatic terms, thereby assimilating metaphor to other familiar uses of language. We will reject this view, and propose in its place the view that, though metaphors can issue in distinctive cognitive and discourse effects, they do so without issuing in metaphorical meaning and truth, and so, without metaphorical communication. Our inspiration derives from Donald Davidson’s critical arguments against metaphorical meaning and Richard Rorty’s exploration of the diverse uses of language. But unlike these authors we ground our discussion squarely in distinctions about causal mechanisms in cooperative activity developed by H.P. Grice and others.
Keywords Coordination  Dead metaphor  Hinting  Joking  Metaphor  Pragmatics  Semantics  Simile  Speaker meaning
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DOI 10.1007/s11245-009-9076-1
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References found in this work BETA
David Lewis (1979). Scorekeeping in a Language Game. Journal of Philosophical Logic 8 (1):339--359.
H. P. Grice (1957). Meaning. Philosophical Review 66 (3):377-388.

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