Conditions on understanding language
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 97 (1):41–60 (1997)
| Abstract | Philosophers in general are uncomfortable, if not downright skeptical, about attributing semantic knowledge, particularly of a semantic theory, to ordinary speakers. 2 Those who do not feel the pinch often adopt a two-pronged defense: they rebut skeptics with an array of distinctions (and hedges), contending that the skeptics' confusions arise because they ignore such.. | |||||||||
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Gurpreet Rattan (2006). The Knowledge in Language. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 6 (3):505-521.
Barry C. Smith (2006). What We Know When We Know a Language. In Ernest Lepore & Barry C. Smith (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language.
Douglas Patterson (2009). Inconsistency Theories of Semantic Paradox. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (2):387-422.
Douglas Patterson (2007). Understanding the Liar. In J. C. Beall (ed.), Revenge of the Liar: New Essays on the Paradox. Oxford University Press.
Eero Hyvönen (1986). Applying a Logical Interpretation of Semantic Nets and Graph Grammars to Natural Language Parsing and Understanding. Synthese 66 (1):177 - 190.
Dean Pettit (2002). Why Knowledge is Unnecessary for Understanding Language. Mind 111 (443):519-550.
Hubert Schwyzer (1989). The Unity of Understanding: A Study in Kantian Problems. Oxford University Press.
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