Acta Analytica 24 (4):275-286 (2009)
|Abstract||Reliabilist theories of knowledge face the “generality problem”; any token of a belief-forming processes instantiates types of different levels of generality, which can vary in reliability. I argue that we exploit this situation in epistemic evaluation; we appraise beliefs in different ways by adverting to reliability at different levels of generality. We can detect at least two distinct uses of reliability, which underlie different sorts of appraisals of beliefs and believers.|
|Keywords||Generality problem Reliabilism Epistemic justification Knowledge Virtue epistemology Epistemic responsibility|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Jarrett Leplin (2007). In Defense of Reliabilism. Philosophical Studies 134 (1):31 - 42.
Mark Newman (2010). The No-Miracles Argument, Reliabilism, and a Methodological Version of the Generality Problem. Synthese 177 (1):111 - 138.
Jonathan Adler & Michael Levin (2002). Is the Generality Problem Too General? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (1):87-97.
Michael Levin (2002). Is the Generality Problem Too General? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (1):87 - 97.
Klemens Kappel (2006). A Diagnosis and Resolution to the Generality Problem. Philosophical Studies 127 (3):525 - 560.
Mark E. Wunderlich (2003). Vector Reliability: A New Approach to Epistemic Justification. Synthese 136 (2):237 - 262.
Earl Conee (2013). The Specificity of the Generality Problem. Philosophical Studies 163 (3):751-762.
Juan Comesaña (2006). A Well-Founded Solution to the Generality Problem. Philosophical Studies 129 (1):27 - 47.
Michael A. Bishop (2010). Why the Generality Problem is Everybody's Problem. Philosophical Studies 151 (2):285 - 298.
Added to index2009-10-21
Total downloads19 ( #71,204 of 722,873 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #60,917 of 722,873 )
How can I increase my downloads?