David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophical Studies 134 (1):31 - 42 (2007)
Objections to reliabilist theories of knowledge and justification have looked insuperable. Reliability is a property of the process of belief formation. But the generality problem apparently makes the specification of any such process ambiguous. The externalism of reliability theories clashes with strongly internalist intuitions. The reliability property does not appear closed under truth-preserving inference, whereas closure principles have strong intuitive appeal. And epistemic paradoxes, like the preface and the lottery, seem unavoidable if knowledge or justification depends on the frequency with which a process generates true beliefs. The present theory has the conceptual resources to meet these challenges. It requires that a justificatory belief-formation process be intentionally applied. It distinguishes the justification of beliefs from that of the believer. And it avoids a frequency interpretation of reliability by introducing a notion of the normalcy of conditions under which processes are intentionally used.
|Keywords||Justification Reliability Closure Coherence Skepticism Externalism Contextualism|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
D. M. Armstrong (1973). Belief, Truth and Knowledge. London,Cambridge University Press.
Stewart Cohen (1999). Contextualism, Skepticism, and the Structure of Reasons. Philosophical Perspectives 13 (s13):57-89.
Alvin I. Goldman (1979/2000). What is Justified Belief? In Ernest Sosa & Jaegwon Kim (eds.), Epistemology. An Anthology. Blackwell. 340-353.
Mark Heller (1989). Relevant Alternatives. Philosophical Studies 55 (1):23 - 40.
Mark Heller (1999). The Proper Role for Contextualism in an Anti-Luck Epistemology. Philosophical Perspectives 13 (s13):115-129.
Citations of this work BETA
Julien Dutant & Erik J. Olsson (2013). Is There a Statistical Solution to the Generality Problem? Erkenntnis 78 (6):1347-1365.
Similar books and articles
Matthew S. Bedke (2010). Developmental Process Reliabilism: On Justification, Defeat, and Evidence. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 73 (1):1 - 17.
Marshall Swain (1985). Justification, Reasons, and Reliability. Synthese 64 (1):69 - 92.
Kelly Becker (2007). Epistemology Modalized. Routledge.
William Harper (1998). Papier Mâché Problems in Epistemology: A Defense of Strong Internalism. Synthese 116 (1):27-49.
Jonathan Kvanvig (1986). How to Be a Reliabilist. American Philosophical Quarterly 23 (2):189 - 198.
Michael A. Bishop (2010). Why the Generality Problem is Everybody's Problem. Philosophical Studies 151 (2):285 - 298.
Juan Comesaña (2006). A Well-Founded Solution to the Generality Problem. Philosophical Studies 129 (1):27 - 47.
Alvin Goldman, Reliabilism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads46 ( #51,882 of 1,696,590 )
Recent downloads (6 months)7 ( #81,292 of 1,696,590 )
How can I increase my downloads?