David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Theory and Decision 49 (2):175-196 (2000)
In a three-candidate election, a scoring rule s (s in [0,1]) assigns 1, s, and 0 points (respectively) to each first, second and third place in the individual preference rankings. The Condorcet efficiency of a scoring rule is defined as the conditional probability that this rule selects the winner in accordance with Condorcet criteria (three Condorcet criteria are considered in the paper). We are interested in the following question: What rule s has the greatest Condorcet efficiency? After recalling the known answer to this question, we investigate the impact of social homogeneity on the optimal value of ?. One of the most salient results we obtain is that the optimality of the Borda rule (s=1/2) holds only if the voters act in an independent way.
|Keywords||Voting rules Borda rule Plurality rule Condorcet criteria Social homogeneity|
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William V. Gehrlein & Dominique Lepelley (2009). The Unexpected Behavior of Plurality Rule. Theory and Decision 67 (3):267-293.
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