The Historical Objection to Scientific Realism
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1982:88 - 97 (1982)
| Abstract | A realist interpretation of successful science is defended against a historical induction to the ultimate failure of current science from the failure of theories which once excelled by current standards. The defense requires (1) restrictions on the forms of success which realism, by its own lights, must explain, (2) referential stability through theory changes where the rejected theory achieves such success, and (3) degrees of truth for scientific statements. | |||||||||
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