David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):1-23 (2010)
According to John McDowell and Bill Brewer, our experiences have the type of content which can be the content of judgements - content which is the result of the actualization of specific conceptual abilities. They defend this view by arguing that our experiences must have such content in order for us to be able to think about our environment. In this paper I show that they do not provide a conclusive argument for this view. Focusing on Brewer’s version of the argument, I show that it rests on a questionable assumption - namely, that if a subject can recognize the normative bearing of a mental content upon what she should think and do, then this content must be the result of the actualization of conceptual capacities (and in this sense conceptual). I argue that considerations regarding the roles played by experience and concepts in our mental lives may require us to reject this assumption
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References found in this work BETA
Gareth Evans (1982). Varieties of Reference. Oxford University Press.
John McDowell (1994). Mind and World. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
J. Campbell (2002). Reference and Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
Bill Brewer (1999/2002). Perception and Reason. Oxford University Press.
Richard Heck (2000). Nonconceptual Content and the "Space of Reasons". Philosophical Review 109 (4):483-523.
Citations of this work BETA
Hemdat Lerman (2012). Demonstrative Content and the Experience of Properties. Dialectica 66 (4):489-515.
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