David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Inquiry 40 (4):427 – 436 (1997)
Suppose various observers are divided randomly into two groups, a large and a small. Not knowing into which group anyone has been sent, each can have strong grounds for believing in being in the large group, although recognizing that every observer in the other group has equally powerful reasons for thinking of this other group as the large one. Justified belief can therefore be observer-relative in a rather paradoxical way. Appreciating this allows one to reject an intriguing new objection against Brandon Carter's 'doomsday argument'. Carter encourages us to doubt that we are among only the first hundredth, say, or first millionth, of all humans who will ever have existed. He thereby reinforces whatever reasons we may have for suspecting that, unless we take great care, the human race will not survive long. Admittedly his argument is weakened if our world is indeterministic, so that there is no suitably guaranteed 'fact of the matter' of how many humans will ever have existed. But even then, it can caution us against believing that a lengthy future for humankind 'is as good as determined'. Of all the objections the argument has yet faced, the new one is the most interesting.
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References found in this work BETA
John Leslie (1992). Time and the Anthropic Principle. Mind 101 (403):521-540.
John Leslie (1994). Testing the Doomsday Argument. Journal of Applied Philosophy 11 (1):31-44.
Torbjörn Tännsjö (1997). Doom Soon? [REVIEW] Inquiry 40 (2):243 – 252.
Citations of this work BETA
Emily Adlam (2014). The Problem of Confirmation in the Everett Interpretation. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 47:21-32.
Kevin Nelson (2009). How and How Not to Make Predictions with Temporal Copernicanism. Synthese 166 (1):91 - 111.
Kevin Nelson (2009). How and How Not to Make Predictions with Temporal Copernicanism. Synthese 166 (1):91-111.
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