David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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In Ralph and Natika Ellis and Newton (ed.), Consciousness and Emotion: Agency, conscious choice, and selective perception. John Benjamins 157--180 (2005)
The sense of self as a covert agent is a key component to the sense of self. This paper focuses on covert action as a preparation to interact. This activates the entire motor system, including the gamma motoneurons innervating the muscle spindles. The proprioceptive stimulation is fed back to the network of origin, contributing to a sense of self as generating the covert activity. A study of motivated behavior in the rat is presented to clarify how the motivation potentiates actions in the body. This is set into Panksepp's subcortical action system of emotional circuits, where the motivation arises.This sets the motor tone for the planned action. This picture if interpreted with Ellis' and Newton's model portraying how emotional motivation can lead to phenomenal consciousness. It is proposed that no motor imagery occurs without involving the body. The higher levels of awareness depend on the subcortical bodily intentionality.
|Keywords||periaqueductal covert gamma facilitation somatosensory|
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Anton Lethin (2008). Anticipating Sensitizes the Body. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (2):279-300.
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