Philosophy of Science 77 (3):317-340 (2010)
|Abstract||Today, mechanisms and mechanistic explanation are very popular in philosophy of science and are deemed a welcome alternative to laws of nature and deductive‐nomological explanation. Starting from Mitchell's pragmatic notion of laws, I cast doubt on their status as a genuine alternative. I argue that (1) all complex‐systems mechanisms ontologically must rely on stable regularities, while (2) the reverse need not hold. Analogously, (3) models of mechanisms must incorporate pragmatic laws, while (4) such laws themselves need not always refer to underlying mechanisms. Finally, I show that Mitchell's account is more encompassing than the mechanistic account *Received August 2008; revised January 2010. †To contact the author, please write to: Centre for Logic and Philosophy of Science, Ghent University, Blandijnberg 2, B‐9000 Belgium; e‐mail: Bert.Leuridan@Ugent.be.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Nancy Cartwright (1997). Models: The Blueprints for Laws. Philosophy of Science 64 (4):303.
William Bechtel & Cory D. Wright (2009). What is Psychological Explanation? In P. Calvo & J. Symons (eds.), Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Psychology. Routledge.
Cory D. Wright & William P. Bechtel (2007). Mechanisms and Psychological Explanation. In Paul Thagard (ed.), Philosophy of Psychology and Cognitive Science. Elsevier.
Stuart S. Glennan (1996). Mechanisms and the Nature of Causation. Erkenntnis 44 (1):49--71.
Petri Ylikoski (2005). The Third Dogma Revisited. Foundations of Science 10 (4):395–419.
Johannes Persson (2005). Tropes as Mechanisms. Foundations of Science 10 (4).
Bert Leuridan (2012). What Are Mechanisms in Social Science? Metascience 21 (2):395-398.
Stuart Glennan (2010). Ephemeral Mechanisms and Historical Explanation. Erkenntnis 72 (2):251 - 266.
Holly Andersen (2011). Mechanisms, Laws, and Regularities. Philosophy of Science 78 (2):325-331.
Added to index2010-05-22
Total downloads130 ( #3,669 of 556,815 )
Recent downloads (6 months)9 ( #8,460 of 556,815 )
How can I increase my downloads?