Assertion, Practical Reason, and Pragmatic Theories of Knowledge

Abstract
Defenders of pragmatic theories of knowledge (such as contextualism and sensitive invariantism) argue that these theories, unlike those that invoke a single standard for knowledge, comport with the intuitively compelling thesis that knowledge is the norm of assertion and practical reason. In this paper, I dispute this thesis, and argue that, therefore, the prospects for both “high standard” approach, and contend that if one abandons the thesis that knowledge is the norm of assertion and practical reason, the most serious arguments against it lose force
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Citations of this work BETA
Jessica Brown (2010). Knowledge and Assertion. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):549-566.
John Turri (2011). The Express Knowledge Account of Assertion. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (1):37-45.
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Janet Levin (2008). Assertion, Practical Reason, and Pragmatic Theories of Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (2):359–384.
Jennifer Lackey (2011). Assertion and Isolated Second-Hand Knowledge. In Jessica Brown & Herman Cappelen (eds.), Assertion: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press. 251--276.
Conor McHugh (2012). What Assertion Doesn't Show. European Journal of Philosophy 20 (3):407-429.
Jim Stone (2007). Contextualism and Warranted Assertion. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (1):92–113.
Jessica Brown (2008). Knowledge and Practical Reason. Philosophy Compass 3 (6):1135-1152.
John Turri (2011). The Express Knowledge Account of Assertion. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (1):37-45.
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