David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Synthese 155 (1):35 - 64 (2007)
It is argued that the intuition driving Kripke’s famous version of Wittgenstein’s meaning skepticism is precisely the one that prompted Hume to despair of his bundle theory of the self: there are no necessary connections between distinct mental states. This interpretation is shown to throw light on Wittgenstein’s notorious idea that all proofs “create concepts.” Wittgenstein has invented a new form of skepticism. Personally I am inclined to regard it as the most radical and original skeptical problem that philosophy has seen to date[.] – Saul Kripke.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Dennis Farrell Thompson (1998). Hume's Skepticism. Dissertation, University of Massachusetts - Amherst
Michael Kremer (2000). Wilson on Kripke's Wittgenstein. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (3):571-584.
Patricia H. Werhane (1987). Some Paradoxes in Kripke's Interpretation of Wittgenstein. Synthese 73 (2):253 - 273.
Graciela De Pierris (2002). Causation as a Philosophical Relation in Hume. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (3):499 - 545.
Louis deRosset (2009). Production and Necessity. Philosophical Review 118 (2):153-181.
Ronald Suter (1986). Saul Wittgenstein's Skeptical Paradox. Philosophical Research Archives 12:183-193.
Mark Collier (2008). Two Puzzles in Hume's Epistemology. History of Philosophy Quarterly 25 (4):301 - 314.
Bryan Frances (2011). Kripke. In Barry Lee (ed.), Key Thinkers in the Philosophy of Language. Continuum.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads35 ( #47,051 of 1,096,547 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #67,370 of 1,096,547 )
How can I increase my downloads?