Chisholm and the metaphysical problem of human freedom

Philosophia 7 (July):537-554 (1978)
Chisholm's theory of freedom implies that a free action necessarily is one that has a certain causal history, Namely one leading back to a brain event (or some similar physiological occurrence) made to happen by the agent. The problem arises of the conceivability of the relation that is supposed to exist, On this theory, Between the agent and the bodily events leading up to his behavior. Furthermore, If it is a contingency whether human beings are sometimes free or always determined, Then chisholm's formulation of the problem of freedom contains an assumption that may be unjustified, Namely that human beings are "responsible agents" in the sense that their free actions necessarily have a certain indeterministic history. It may be an empirical fact that every human action in fact has a sufficient causal condition
Keywords Agency  Causation  Determinism  Freedom  Metaphysics  Responsibility  Will  Chisholm, R
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DOI 10.1007/BF02378833
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