Graduate studies at Western
Dialectica 59 (1):51-61 (2005)
|Abstract||To the extent that indeterminacy intervenes between our reasons for action and our decisions, intentions and actions, our freedom seems to be reduced, not enhanced. Free will becomes nothing more than the power to choose irrationally. In recognition of this problem, some recent libertarians have suggested that free will is paradigmatically manifested only in actions for which we have reasons for both or all the alternatives. In these circumstances, however we choose, we choose rationally. Against this kind of account, most fully developed by Robert Kane, critics have pressed the demand for contrastive explanations. Kane has responded by arguing that the demand does not need to be met: responsibility for an action does not require that there be a contrastive explanation of that action. However, this response proves too much: it implies that agents are responsible not only for the actions they choose, but also for the counterfactual actions which were equally available to them|
|Keywords||Action Contrast Explanation Free Will Metaphysics Reasons Kane, Robert|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Carl Ginet (2002). Reasons Explanations of Action: Causalist Versus Noncausalist Accounts. In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook on Free Will. Oxford University Press.
Robert F. Allen (2005). Free Will and Indeterminism: Robert Kane's Libertarianism. Journal of Philosophical Research 30:341-355.
Jason Dickenson (2007). Reasons, Causes, and Contrasts. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (1):1–23.
Ishtiyaque Haji (1999). Indeterminism and Frankfurt-Type Examples. Philosophical Explorations 2 (1):42-58.
Vere Chappell (1994). Locke on the Freedom of the Will. In G. A. J. Rogers (ed.), Locke's Philosophy: Content and Context. Oxford University Press.
Roksana Alavi (2005). Robert Kane, Free Will, and Neuro-Indeterminism. Philo 8 (2):95-108.
Ishtiyaque Haji (2005). Libertarianism, Luck, and Action Explanation. Journal of Philosophical Research 30:321-340.
Robert D. Murray (1995). Is Davidson's Theory of Action Consistent? Canadian Journal of Philosophy 25 (3):317 - 334.
Mark Risjord (2005). Reasons, Causes, and Action Explanation. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 35 (3):294-306.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads34 ( #40,603 of 739,404 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #61,269 of 739,404 )
How can I increase my downloads?