Concepts: Where Fodor went wrong

Philosophical Psychology 12 (1):5-23 (1999)
In keeping with other recent efforts, Fodor's CONCEPTS focuses on the metaphysics of conceptual content, bracketing such epistemological questions as, "How can we know the contents of our concepts?" Fodor's metaphysical account of concepts, called "informational atomism," stipulates that the contents of a subject's concepts are fixed by the nomological lockings between the subject and the world. After sketching Fodor's "what else?" argument in support of this view, we offer a number of related criticisms. All point to the same conclusion: Fodor is ultimately not merely bracketing the epistemology of conceptual content; his theory makes answers to the epistemological questions impossible
Keywords Atomism  Content  Epistemology  Knowledge  Fodor, J
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DOI 10.1080/095150899105909
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Jerry A. Fodor (1984). Observation Reconsidered. Philosophy of Science 51 (March):23-43.

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