David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Synthese 155 (1):127 - 155 (2007)
Doxastic responsibility matters, morally and epistemologically. Morally, because many of our intuitive ascriptions of blame seem to track back to agents’ apparent responsibility for beliefs; epistemologically because some philosophers identify epistemic justification with deontological permissibility. But there is a powerful argument which seems to show that we are rarely or never responsible for our beliefs, because we cannot control them. I examine various possible responses to this argument, which aim to show either that doxastic responsibility does not require that we control our beliefs, or that as a matter of fact we do exercise the right kind of control over our beliefs. I argue that the existing arguments are all wanting: in fact, our lack of control over our beliefs typically excuses us of responsibility for them.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
William Alston (1989). Epistemic Justification. Cornell University Press.
Nomy Arpaly (2003). Unprincipled Virtue: An Inquiry Into Moral Agency. Oxford University Press.
L. Jonathan Cohen (1989). Belief and Acceptance. Mind 98 (391):367-389.
Richard Feldman (2001). Voluntary Belief and Epistemic Evaluation. In Matthias Steup (ed.), Knowledge, Truth, and Duty: Essays on Epistemic Justification, Responsibility, and Virtue. Oxford University Press. 77--92.
Mark Heller (2000). Hobartian Voluntarism: Grounding a Deontological Conceptionof Epistemic Justification. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81 (2):130–141.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Andrei A. Buckareff (2006). Compatibilism and Doxastic Control. Philosophia 34 (2):143-152.
Matthias Steup (2000). Doxastic Voluntarism and Epistemic Deontology. Acta Analytica 15 (1):25-56.
Santiago Echeverri (2011). Epistemic Responsibility and Perceptual Experience. In David Lauer, Christophe Laudou, Robin Celikates & Georg W. Bertram (eds.), Expérience et réflexivité: perspectives au-delà de l’empirisme et de l’idéalisme. L'Harmattan.
Brian Ribeiro (2002). Epistemological Skepticism(s) and Rational Self-Control. The Monist 85 (3):468-477.
Andrei A. Buckareff (2006). Doxastic Decisions and Controlling Belief. Acta Analytica 21 (1):102-114.
Rico Vitz, Doxastic Voluntarism. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Conor Mchugh (2014). Exercising Doxastic Freedom. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (1):1-37.
James Montmarquet (2008). Virtue and Voluntarism. Synthese 161 (3):393 - 402.
Miriam McCormick (2011). Taking Control of Belief. Philosophical Explorations 14 (2):169 - 183.
Neal Judisch (2005). Responsibility, Manipulation and Ownership: Reflections on the Fischer/Ravizza Program. Philosophical Explorations 8 (2):115-130.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads116 ( #10,087 of 1,140,280 )
Recent downloads (6 months)5 ( #38,047 of 1,140,280 )
How can I increase my downloads?