David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 155 (1):127 - 155 (2007)
Doxastic responsibility matters, morally and epistemologically. Morally, because many of our intuitive ascriptions of blame seem to track back to agents’ apparent responsibility for beliefs; epistemologically because some philosophers identify epistemic justification with deontological permissibility. But there is a powerful argument which seems to show that we are rarely or never responsible for our beliefs, because we cannot control them. I examine various possible responses to this argument, which aim to show either that doxastic responsibility does not require that we control our beliefs, or that as a matter of fact we do exercise the right kind of control over our beliefs. I argue that the existing arguments are all wanting: in fact, our lack of control over our beliefs typically excuses us of responsibility for them.
|Keywords||Philosophy Philosophy Epistemology Logic Metaphysics Philosophy of Language|
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References found in this work BETA
John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza (1998). Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility. Cambridge University Press.
Thomas Scanlon (1998). What We Owe to Each Other. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Robert H. Kane (1996). The Significance of Free Will. Oxford University Press.
Derk Pereboom (2001). Living Without Free Will. Cambridge University Press.
Nomy Arpaly (2003). Unprincipled Virtue: An Inquiry Into Moral Agency. Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Conor McHugh (2013). Epistemic Responsibility and Doxastic Agency. Philosophical Issues 23 (1):132-157.
Sanford C. Goldberg (forthcoming). Should Have Known. Synthese:1-32.
Andrea Kruse (forthcoming). Why Doxastic Responsibility is Not Based on Direct Doxastic Control. Synthese:1-32.
Patrick Lenta (2016). Freedom of Conscience and the Value of Personal Integrity. Ratio Juris 29 (2):246-263.
Marion Smiley (2014). Volitional Excuses, Self-Narration, and Blame. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (1):85-101.
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