Epistemic utility and the evaluation of experiments

Philosophy of Science 44 (3):368-386 (1977)
William K. Goosens claims to show that my account of epistemic utility runs into serious difficulties when confronted with certain attractive conditions of adequacy for the evaluation of experiments. I show that those conditions of adequacy which are, indeed, acceptable to both of us are satisfied by the procedures for evaluating experiments mandated by combining my theory of epistemic utilities with the approach to evaluating experiments on which Goosens' argument is based. In particular, I demonstrate that my theory does not violate the requirement that an "ideal experiment" be no worse than any alternative experiment
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DOI 10.1086/288755
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