For the Sake of the Argument: Ramsey Test Conditionals, Inductive Inference, and Nonmonotonic Reasoning
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Cambridge University Press (1996)
This book by one of the world's foremost philosophers in the fields of epistemology and logic offers an account of suppositional reasoning relevant to practical deliberation, explanation, prediction and hypothesis testing. Suppositions made 'for the sake of argument' sometimes conflict with our beliefs, and when they do, some beliefs are rejected and others retained. Thanks to such belief contravention, adding content to a supposition can undermine conclusions reached without it. Subversion can also arise because suppositional reasoning is ampliative. These two types of nonmonotonic logic are the focus of this book. A detailed comparison of nonmonotonicity appropriate to both belief contravening and ampliative suppositional reasoning reveals important differences that have been overlooked.
|Keywords||Hypothesis Commonsense reasoning Conditionals (Logic Induction (Logic Inference Nonmonotonic reasoning|
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|Buy the book||$1.89 new (99% off) $1.89 used (99% off) $72.00 direct from Amazon (10% off) Amazon page|
|Call number||BC183.L48 1996|
|ISBN(s)||0521497132 0521039010 9780521497138|
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Citations of this work BETA
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Isaac Levi (2010). Probability Logic, Logical Probability, and Inductive Support. Synthese 172 (1):97 - 118.
Adam Sennet & Jonathan Weisberg (2012). Embedding "If and Only If". Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (2):449 - 460.
John Cantwell (2013). Conditionals in Causal Decision Theory. Synthese 190 (4):661-679.
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