Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (3):571-591 (2002)
|Abstract||In this paper I discuss the claim (advanced in various ways by Joseph Levine, Frank Jackson and David Chalmers) that the successful reduction of qualitative to physical states requires some sort of intelligible connection between our qualitative and physical concepts, which in turn requires a conceptual analysis of our qualitative concepts in causal-functional terms. While I defend this claim against some of its recent critics, I ultimately dispute it, and propose a different way to get the requisite intelligible connection between qualitative and physical concepts|
|Keywords||Conceptual Analysis Mental States Metaphysics Reduction Chalmers, D Jackson, F Levine, J|
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