Is conceptual analysis needed for the reduction of qualitative states?

In this paper I discuss the claim that the successful reduction of qualitative to physical states requires some sort of intelligible connection between our qualitative and physical concepts, which in turn requires a conceptual analysis of our qualitative concepts in causal-functional terms. While I defend this claim against some of its recent critics, I ultimately dispute it, and propose a different way to get the requisite intelligible connection between qualitative and physical concepts
Keywords Conceptual Analysis  Mental States  Metaphysics  Reduction  Chalmers, D  Jackson, F  Levine, J
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