David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Quarterly 59 (235):237-251 (2009)
Libertarianism seems vulnerable to a serious problem concerning present luck, because it requires indeterminism somewhere in the causal chain leading to directly free action. Compatibilism, by contrast, is thought to be free of this problem, as not requiring indeterminism in the causal chain. I argue that this view is false: compatibilism is subject to a problem of present luck. This is less of a problem for compatibilism than for libertarianism. However, its effects are just as devastating for one kind of compatibilism, the kind of compatibilism which is history-sensitive, and therefore must take the problem of constitutive luck seriously. The problem of present luck confronting compatibilism is sufficient to undermine the history-sensitive compatibilist's response to remote – constitutive – luck.
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References found in this work BETA
Robert Kane (1999). Responsibility, Luck, and Chance: Reflections on Free Will and Determinism. Journal of Philosophy 96 (5):217-40.
Peter van Inwagen (2000). Free Will Remains a Mystery. Philosophical Perspectives 14:1-20.
E. J. Coffman (2007). Thinking About Luck. Synthese 158 (3):385 - 398.
Alfred R. Mele (1999). Ultimate Responsibility and Dumb Luck. Social Philosophy and Policy 16 (2):274.
Ishtiyaque Haji & Stefaan E. Cuypers (2007). Magical Agents, Global Induction, and the Internalism/Externalism Debate. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (3):343 – 371.
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